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IN
DEFENSE OF FREE CAPITAL MARKETS
The Case Against a New
International Financial
Architecture
By David
DeRosa
Date Published: January 2001
ISBN 1-57600-036-X
Suggested Retail Price: $27.95
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Excerpt
A compelling argument for less regulation of the global
markets.
Advocates of financial reform say that the 1990s and earlier
periods teach that the foreign exchange market is
episodically out of control and that capital flows can
destabilize world markets, behaving more like wrecking balls
than pendulums, in Soros's words. Consequently, the whole
international monetary system needs redesign and
supranational institutions like the IMF must be permanently
and deeply involved with running the world economy.
These positions must be tempered by the study of the
countries that have suffered the sharpest reversals of
fortune in the 1990s. These same nations had dangerous
domestic financial policies in place for a significant time
before they descended into crisis. Moreover, when crisis did
erupt, the government's response often exacerbated their
problems.
The picture of history that is being told by most, but not
all, of the would-be reformers lacks the essential
recognition that financial crisis is mostly homegrown, not
imported, and that it is usually preventable with
modification of bad financial policies. By analogy, one
could imagine a large, complex telephone network that is
subject to intermittent failures. The reformers have
concluded that the problem must be with the master switching
circuitry, the analogue of the international capital market,
before having taken a close look at the subscriber's kitchen
wall phone, the parallel for domestic financial policies.
The common denominator in practically every crisis in the
1990s was an experiment with a fixed foreign exchange rate
regime. Fixed foreign exchange regimes are founded on the
promise of currency stability. Some of them have survived
for years and have basked in their apparent success. Yet so
many have ended in spectacular turmoil that one has to
wonder if there isn't an inevitable day of reckoning for all
pegged exchange rate currencies. What is often misunderstood
is that fixed exchange rate systems, in and of themselves,
have the power to attract foreign capital, provided that
they reflect an appearance of permanence. They incubate the
buildup of massive disequilibrium positions in the foreign
exchange and fixed income markets. The famous carry trade,
in which investors have taken leveraged positions in
stabilized, high-yielding foreign currencies, is one
example. Another is the phenomenon of foreign currency
denominated debt accumulation in countries with fixed
exchange rates. Both are motivated by the illusion that the
fixed exchange rate regime will be permanent. If the day
comes when the market suspects otherwise, a ferocious
adjustment process can take place at a moment's notice when
practically everyone inside and outside of the country tries
to dump their exposure to the local currency.
The '90s, far from being an indictment of the international
financial system, are a striking reminder of how potentially
destructive fixed exchange rate regimes can be. Equally
striking is the fact that once broken fixed exchange rate
systems were replaced with floating regimes, no further
disruptions occurred.
From In Defense of Free Capital
Markets ©2001 Bloomberg Press
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